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MANDATORY PRO BONO IN CIVIL CASES: THE WRONG
ANSWER TO THE RIGHT QUESTION
ESTHER F. LARDENT*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to
repeat it.' ' 1
George Santayana
"You have a pretty good case, Mr. Pitkin. How much jus-
tice can you afford?" 2
Lawyer to Potential Client in New Yorker cartoon
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, there has been a resurgence of interest
in mandating public service on the part of attorneys.' The debate
around this issue has been vigorous and prolonged. Rarely, how-
ever, has that debate incorporated a clear understanding of the na-
ture of and rationale for mandated attorney service, a realistic
assessment of the impact and feasibility of such service, or an analy-
sis of past efforts to impose such a service requirement. A compre-
hensive review of mandatory pro bono proposals introduced during
the 1970s and 1980s, including the most recent proposal in Mary-
land, reveals the ultimate futility of this approach. This article will
not address the constitutional issues often raised in discussions of
mandatory attorney service in the civil context-issues such as the
power of the courts to appoint uncompensated counsel, the obliga-
tions of the lawyer as an officer of the court, the assertion that man-
dated service is an impermissible taking without compensation, a
violation of the equal protection clause, or an imposition of involun-
* Chief Consultant to the American Bar Association's Postconviction Death Pen-
alty Representation Project. A.B., Pembroke College of Brown University, 1968; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1971. Ms. Lardent is a consultant and trainer who has written
and lectured extensively in the area of pro bono publico service. She was the first director
of the Volunteer Lawyers Project of the Boston Bar Association, a nationally recognized
pioneering, pro bono program, and edited for the American Bar Association The Re-
source: A Pro Bono Manual, a widely used handbook on the development and enhance-
ment of pro bono programs. Her present duties include recruiting volunteer counsel to
represent death row inmates.
1. 1 G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON 82 (1905-1906).
2. Handelsman, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 24, 1973, at 52 (cartoon caption).
3. See Miskiewicz, Mandatory Pro Bono Won't Disappear, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at 1,
col. 1.
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tary servitude. The law with respect to the constitutionality of man-
dated service is unsettled at best and therefore not dispositive.4 The
assessment of mandatory service instead must be undertaken in the
context of the surrounding political realities. Proponents of
mandatory pro bono in civil cases in state after state have failed to
garner the support of their colleagues for even the most modest
proposals. In those few jurisdictions where a program which argua-
bly falls within the definition of mandatory pro bono has been im-
plemented, there have been no effective empirical studies of the
impact of those programs. Anecdotal information suggests that
these programs have met with limited success at best and have not
accomplished the goals established by their proponents. The events
of the last decade strongly suggest that the heat and light accompa-
nying the mandatory pro bono debate have diverted considerable
resources from the real issue, ensuring access to justice regardless
of economic status, without measurably improving such access.
I. THE SCOPE OF MANDATORY PRO BONO
The debate about mandatory pro bono has not served to clarify
the concept. Because pro bono publico service historically has referred
to charitably donated assistance, the term "mandatory pro bono" is
itself a problem-a classic oxymoron, not unlike jumbo shrimp and
military intelligence.5 Beyond the simple imprecision of the term
itself, mandatory pro bono has been used to refer to a broad spec-
trum of actions, including membership requirements adopted by
voluntary local bars,6 quantitative guidelines or definitions of pro
bono established by local bars,7 and programs established by the
federal courts under which lawyers are appointed without compen-
sation to represent in forma pauperis litigants.'
Of course, none of these programs are mandatory in the literal
sense, and their inclusion only serves to confuse and blunt the anal-
4. See generally Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735
(1980).
5. Despite the ambiguity of the term "mandatory pro bono," the author will, for the
sake of convenience, employ the term in this article.
6. See Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono: The Shape of Things to Come?, 73 A.B.A. J. 62
(Dec. 1987). For example, local bar associations in Florida, Texas, Illinois, and Wiscon-
sin adopted mandatory pro bono requirements as a condition for membership.
7. See Miskiewicz, supra note 3, at 8, col. 1.
8. See Graham, supra note 6, at 62. Jurisdictions which have adopted these pro-
grams include "the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas, the Northern and Central
Districts of Illinois, the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, the District of Con-
necticut and the San Antonio division of Texas' Western District." See also Miskiewicz,
supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
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ysis of mandatory pro bono. Voluntary bar programs which condi-
tion membership on the commitment to provide service or funds,
like the program in Orange County, Florida, certainly are not
mandatory since the only "sanction"--the inability to join the local
bar-has no direct economic or professional impact on the attor-
ney.9 Bar guidelines which merely suggest a minimum level of vol-
untary effort, like those adopted by the Chicago and Los Angeles
bars, also clearly are not mandatory requirements.' 0 While some
federal appointment programs appear to be truly mandatory, in
practice they are voluntary in nature and impose no sanctions for
failure to participate. They also typically include generous provi-
sions for opting out of cases deemed nonmeritorious by the attor-
ney. " In any event, the Supreme Court's decision in Mallard v. The
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 2-holding
that title 28, section 1915(d) of the United States Code does not
give a federal court the authority to require attorneys to represent
indigents in civil cases-has, at least for the present, foreclosed any
argument that these can be described as mandatory programs.'"
9. See Marin-Roso & Stepter, Orange County: Mandatory Pro Bono in a Voluntary Bar
Association, 59 FLA. B.J. 21, 21-22 (Dec. 1985). The Orange County Bar Association re-
quires its members to take two pro bono cases per year or to make a $250 financial
donation to the Legal Aid Society. Id. at 21. There is no indication that the "sanction"
of dismissal from the voluntary bar is enforced.
10. CHICAGO BAR ASSOCIATION, LEGAL AID CoMMITEE's REPORT ON THE CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF INDIGENT PERSONS IN CHICAGO (adopted Aug. 14, 1986); Los ANGELES COUNTY
BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING CoMMrrrEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES (adopted Feb. 1989).
11. See, e.g., E.D. ARK. R. 34. Although appointments by the court "shall be
mandatory," a large portion of the rule is devoted to establishing guidelines for declin-
ing an appointment, and there are no corresponding sanctions for doing so. In fact, the
name of the withdrawing attorney simply is placed back on the master list used for se-
lecting attorneys rather than being used for the next assignment. Id.; see also Shapiro,
supra note 4, at 755 (noting that, in the context of court-imposed assignments, "there is
a dearth of precedent involving the imposition of sanctions on attorneys for refusal to
represent an indigent litigant on a court assignment").
12. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989).
13. In Mallard, the District Court selected Mallard to represent indigent inmates.
When Mallard tried and was not allowed to withdraw from this court-imposed service,
he appealed to the District Court, which denied him relief. When the Court of Appeals
denied his petition for a writ of mandamus, Mallard appealed to the Supreme Court
which held that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)-which provides that federal courts may "request
an attorney to represent any person claiming informa pauperis status"-does not give a
federal court the authority to require attorneys to represent indigents in civil cases. Id. at
1816. Although this decision sets the immediate question to rest, it is worth noting that
the Court ruled only on the validity of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
Although respondent and its amici urge us to affirm the Court of Appeals'judg-
ment on the ground that the federal courts do have such authority, the District
Court did not invoke its inherent power in its opinion below, and the Court of
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The term "mandatory pro bono" should be applied only to
those proposals which condition a lawyer's ability to continue to
practice law on the fulfillment of a quantifiable public service obliga-
tion and which provide for a reporting and enforcement mechanism
for those who fail to meet that obligation. Because authority over
the licensure and discipline of attorneys varies from state to state,
the obligation may be put in place by an integrated bar association,
a state court, or a legislature. Each of the attributes noted above-a
quantifiable, enforceable, and enforced obligation which is a condi-
tion of continuing licensure-must be present if the obligation is to
be truly mandatory in nature. Proposals which seek to amend a
state's ethical rules without providing a quantifiable goal and with-
out making provision for enforcement should be seen as only quasi-
mandatory in nature.
Beyond the core definition of mandatory pro bono which fo-
cuses on the clarification of the "mandatory" nature of these pro-
posals, there are a series of issues, often unresolved and even
unidentified in the debate over mandatory pro bono, which address
the second aspect of the definition; the identification of what consti-
tutes "pro bono" service. Here, as with the core definition of
mandatory service, there is little clarity and less uniformity. If
mandatory pro bono is to address the purposes for which it is estab-
lished, clarity with respect to the second element of the definition is
essential.
The first issue surrounding the definition of pro bono service is
determining which members of the bar will be included in the scope
of the proposal. Arguably, if mandatory pro bono is a condition of
bar licensure, all licensed attorneys should be covered. There are
categories of attorneys, however, who arguably should be exempted
from mandatory service. Judges obviously present a problem, as do
inactive attorneys who are not practicing in the jurisdiction or who
are retired or located in the jurisdiction but not engaged in legal
work. This category of attorneys is perhaps the easiest to accommo-
date through an exemption for those who are not registered as prac-
ticing attorneys in the jurisdiction.
Government attorneys who often are barred statutorily from
the private practice of law or who may have broadbased conflicts
problems present another category that might seek exemption.
Appeals did not offer this ground for denying Mallard's application for a writ of
mandamus. We therefore leave that issue for another day.
Id. at 1823.
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Since these lawyers enjoy the privilege of practicing in the jurisdic-
tion, consistency would argue against their exemption. The limita-
tions on the ability of government attorneys to serve could be
addressed through the amendment of existing statutes, a realistic
analysis of conflict of interest, or some form of alternative service
which avoids the special problems of this group.
A hotly debated issue involving the scope of a mandatory pro
bono requirement is the inclusion of legal services lawyers and pub-
lic defenders. Lawyers who work full time for poor people at sala-
ries which are a fraction of those paid to their colleagues in private
practice essentially have "given at the office," and it could be argued
that the imposition of a mandatory requirement would place an ex-
tra burden on those in our profession who are most public spirited.
On the other hand, the exemption of any category of practicing at-
torney might violate the principles of professionalism and equity
which underlie mandatory proposals. In addition, there are attor-
neys in private practice who focus their efforts on public interest
law; therefore an exemption solely for staff attorneys, in nonprofit
organizations could be considered arbitrary.
Finally, in defining which attorneys would be subject to
mandatory service, there is the issue of collective versus individual
responsibility. The quantifiable mandatory obligation, however it is
ultimately defined, could be viewed as the non-transferable obliga-
tion of each individual lawyer. Alternatively, law firms could be al-
lowed to meet collectively the obligation by aggregating the services
performed by their attorneys. Because law firms are seen as single
entities for disciplinary purposes in other contexts (for example,
conflicts of interest), such a practice, some proponents argue, is fea-
sible, more efficient, and produces more hours and higher quality
pro bono work.' 4
If the threshold question of identifying those attorneys who
should be subject to mandatory service is fraught with complexity, it
pales in comparison to the core issue of defining the scope of pro
bono service which would meet the mandatory requirement. The
task of defining "mandatory pro bono" can itself be problematic; 5
indeed, it is possible that the definition might purposefully be
14. The possibility of collective efforts to meet a mandatory obligation raises inter-
esting disciplinary questions. For example, would an entire law firm be disciplined, per-
haps through censure or suspension of each of its members, if it failed to meet the
mandatory standard?
15. For a discussion of the ambiguities inherent in the term "mandatory pro bono,"
see supra text accompanying notes 5-8.
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blurred in an attempt to gain broadbased support for a mandatory
initiative. If the impact of mandatory pro bono efforts is to be evalu-
ated, clarity of definition with respect to the scope of activity is criti-
cal. Five basic issues, with literally scores of sub-issues, dominate the
debate on this aspect of mandatory pro bono.
First, there is the lawyer versus citizen debate. Simply put, the
issue is whether community service activities undertaken by an at-
torney which do not relate directly to her or his professional role
should be counted toward a quantifiable mandatory obligation. Be-
cause one of the most consistent underlying rationales for mandat-
ing service is the special role of the lawyer within society,1 6 it seems
obvious that activities which reflect good citizenship, such as service
on the board of a community organization or non-profit group like
the symphony or a home for abused children, should not constitute
pro bono activity for this purpose. A number of proposals, how-
ever, incorporate these activities, undoubtedly in an effort to make
them more palatable to the majority of lawyers.
For those proposals which do limit the quantifiable, mandatory
obligation to services performed as a lawyer, a second, even thorn-
ier issue remains-the issue of client representation versus other ac-
tivities. The critical need to provide legal services to indigents in
order to ensure equal access to the justice system is the dominant
motivation for many mandatory proposals.17 Therefore one could
argue that only activities related to the direct representation of tar-
get groups or individuals should constitute quantifiable activity for
purposes of reporting, monitoring, and enforcement. For some at-
torneys, however, direct representation is not the only method-
and certainly not the most efficient method-of ensuring and en-
hancing access. Proponents of a broader definition of service cite
activities such as service on the board of a legal services program or
public interest legal organization, service on a bar committee which
16. For a discussion of the impetus for mandatory pro bono, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 21-30.
17. See, e.g., CENTER FOR GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY, HOLLAND LAW CENTER,
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR AND UNDERREPRESENTED CITI-
ZENS OF FLORIDA: AN OVERVIEW (1980) [hereinafter THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR OF
FLORIDA]; CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION, NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT, NORTH
DAKOTA TRIAL LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION, A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR
THE POOR: A PRACTICAL, EQUITABLE AND POLITICAL PROPOSAL FOR BAR LEADERSHIP
(1988) [hereinafter A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES]; COMMITrEE TO IM-
PROVE THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE
OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1989) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NEW YORK];
MARYLAND LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL
SERVICES TO MARYLAND'S POOR (1988) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN].
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develops an effective pro se program, and the provision of training or
support to other pro bono attorneys as examples of activities which
may do more to advance the cause ofjustice than individual repre-
sentation. One difficulty with this credible approach is the problem
of where to draw the line. Should lawyers receive mandatory pro
bono "credit" for serving on the board of directors of a bar associa-
tion which makes support for legal services a priority? For directing
lawyers fund drives to raise money for legal services? For attending
training programs in poverty or civil rights law to improve their pro
bono representation?
A third definitional issue is the category of clients to be served
by mandatory pro bono efforts. Many proposals focus on the legal
needs of our poorest citizens, while others anticipate the inclusion
of the near poor, the handicapped, special groups like children and
the elderly, non-profit organizations, and other underserved
groups.'" When the definition expands from service to the poor
and their advocate organizations to service in the public interest, the
definitional and political problems become more complex. If ser-
vice in the public interest should be included, then unpopular
causes or individuals may fall within the scope of the proposal de-
spite their polarizing effect on the public at large and the legal pro-
fession. To avoid perceptions of ideological bias, some would argue
that the types of clients served by conservative legal foundations
also should qualify despite the fact that they often have considerable
financial resources.
A fourth issue in defining pro bono for the purposes of
mandatory programs is whether the service is to be provided with-
out compensation or at reduced rates of compensation. While re-
cent mandatory proposals, to the extent that they address this issue
at all, appear to anticipate that mandated service will be provided
without compensation," there is considerable disagreement about
this issue. The American Bar Association's (ABA) definition of pub-
lic service, adopted in 1975 and still the official policy of the Associ-
ation, includes partially compensated service.20 This approach is
supported by the argument that limiting service to uncompensated
18. See, e.g., ACTION PLAN, supra note 17, at 6 (the Maryland Legal Services Corpora-
tion "set[s] the income eligibility standard for legal assistance at not greater than 50
percent of the State's median family income"). See generally THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
POOR OF FLORIDA, supra note 17; A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES, supra
note 17; PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NEW YORK, supra note 17.
19. See, e.g., ACTION PLAN, supra note 17, at 32.
20. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OF THE AMERICAN BAR Asso-
CIATION, IMPLEMENTING THE LAWYER'S PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE OBLIGATION app. at 19
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representation discriminates against the less affluent segments of
the bar. Once again, one can identify the prospect of a definitional
task so fraught with conflict and compromise that it overwhelms the
potential value of the services to be provided. Should lawyers who
accept criminal appointments at rates that certainly are minimal be
permitted to apply that representation to meet the civil require-
ment? Would representation at the hourly rate of $ 100, by an attor-
ney whose customary hourly rate is $250, comply?
The final issue, and perhaps the most controversial, is the ques-
tion of monetary contributions in lieu of service, described colloqui-
ally as a "buy out" provision. Those who argue that pro bono
service is the sine qua non of professionalism find the buy out provi-
sion unhelpful and demeaning. Others believe that for lawyers who
have no particular interest or expertise in serving disadvantaged cli-
ents a buy out provision is the most efficient means of providing
increased services. Within this broader definitional question, of
course, lurk many other issues. If a buy out is permitted, should it
be partial or total? What should the buy out rate be, and should it
be graduated to avoid a regressive policy which places a greater bur-
den on nonaffluent lawyers? A monetary contribution may be tax
deductible, while donated services are not; therefore, does a buy out
option create further inequities?
These critical issues, which often have been ignored in thc. ini-
tial enthusiasm for a mandatory pro bono proposal, must be ad-
dressed in shaping any mandatory service requirement. Yet these
issues are part of the larger debate in the legal profession about the
(1977) [hereinafter SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE]. The American
Bar Association (ABA) defines public interest service as:
legal service provided without fee or at a substantially reduced fee, which falls into
one or more of the following areas:
1. Poverty Law: Legal services in civil and criminal matters of importance to a
client who does not have the financial resources to compensate counsel.
2. Civil Rights Law: Legal representation involving a right of an individual
which society has a special interest in protecting.
3. Public Rights Law: Legal representation involving an important right be-
longing to a significant segment of the public.
4. Charitable Organization Representation: Legal service to charitable, reli-
gious, civic, governmental and educational institutions in matters in further-
ance of their organizational purpose, where the payment of customary legal
fees would significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or
would be otherwise inappropriate.
5. Administration of Justice: Activity, whether under bar association auspices,
or otherwise, which is designed to increase the availability of legal services, or
otherwise improve the administration of justice.
Id. (emphasis added).
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role and future of the profession. Their presence in the pressure
cooker that is mandatory pro bono inevitably causes debate to re-
flect the uncertainties and schisms in our profession. As a result,
they often are addressed in terms of pragmatic political concerns
and are not resolved in a consistent manner which advances the
goals of the mandatory proposal.
II. THE IMPETUS FOR MANDATORY PRO BONO
Here is not a classic confrontation between progress
and reaction-the good guys against the bad guys. Rather,
we have on both sides lawyers of high principle and good
will who want essentially the same thing-for the legal pro-
fession to meet what they see as a serious professional
obligation. 2
Barlow Christiansen's observation about the proponents and oppo-
nents of mandatory pro bono is as true now, in the midst of a sec-
ond flurry of activity with respect to mandatory pro bono, as it was
in 1981 in the midst of the first controversy about mandatory
service.
Three common themes comprise the rationale for mandatory
pro bono. The first, and undoubtedly the most powerful, is the ex-
tent to which the need for legal services, particularly among the
poor, is unmet.2 2 Indeed, it can be argued that the primary impetus
for the growing number of mandatory pro bono proposals during
the past two years is the existence of several recently completed,
empirically sound studies which demonstrate the gap between legal
resources and unmet legal needs.23 The increase in the number of
Americans living at or below the poverty threshold in the 1980s, the
increasing complexity and "legalization" of our society, 24 and the
stagnant federal funding for legal services in the context of the fed-
21. Christiansen, The Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J. 1,
5 (1981).
22. Recent empirical studies at both the state and national level consistently find that
only between 15-20% of the critical legal needs of low income persons presently are
being met. See, e.g., A WORKABLE PLAN FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES, supra note 17, at 17;
PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NEW YORK, supra note 17, at 12; see also SPANGENBERG REPORT,
IN Two NATIONWIDE SURVEYS: 1989 PILOT ASSESSMENTS OF THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF
THE POOR AND OF THE PUBLIC GENERALLY (Sept. 1989).
23. See supra note 22; see also ACTION PLAN, supra note 17 at 6-25.
24. See Wentzel,Justice Denied, The Evening Sun (Baltimore), May 21, 1987, at Al0,
col. 1 (quoting U.S. Rep. Benjamin Cardin: "There have been major changes in the
complexities of laws and we have more poor people today.")..
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eral deficit,25 have resulted in a sense of urgency on the part of con-
cerned citizens, particularly the organized bar, about the need to
find creative new methods to increase resources.
The second wellspring of mandatory pro bono is a broader con-
cern about the commercialization of the practice of law and the need
to reaffirm our commitment to law as a profession. This commit-
ment is reflected in a number of themes among proponents. One
strand of this argument is an emphasis on the traditional role of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and an instrumentality of justice
with a duty to serve those who are unable to retain counsel.26 A
variation on this theme is the idea that pro bono service is required
of every lawyer as a condition of the monopoly on access to the
courts which lawyers enjoy. Some commentators use both themes
to support mandatory pro bono. "Lawyers have a pro bono publico
obligation, arising both from the profession's tradition of service
before gain and from the lawyer's essential and monopolistic posi-
tion in the justice system."27 In distinguishing the lawyer's monop-
olistic role from that of other regulated professions (to address the
argument that "doctors don't do it, dentists don't do it, why should
we"), some have emphasized that lawyers are not simply gatekeep-
ers; they contribute directly to the problem of unmet legal need
through the use of their exclusive privilege for affluent clients in an
adversarial system.28
The final justification advanced for mandatory pro bono is a
somewhat surprising one-a sense of disappointment with the con-
25. In Maryland, for example, federal funding for civil legal services diminished by
$3.5 million in the early 1980s.
While Congress rejected President Reagan's efforts to totally eliminate federal
funding for legal assistance to the poor, it did reduce appropriations to the U.S.
Legal Services Corporation (principal funding source of Maryland's Legal Aid
Bureau) by 25%. At the same time, Maryland (responding to federal cuts to
Maryland's Title XX Social Services funds) reduced the State's Judicare pro-
gram funding from $2.5 million to $249,000.
Belgrad & Rhudy, Legal Services to Maryland's Poor, 20 MD. B.J. 13, 13 (1987).
26. One of the earliest manifestations of this view is a 1494 English statute entitled
"A mean to help and speed poor persons in their suits." 11 Hen. 7, ch. 12 (1495),
reprinted in W. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF
KINGJOHN 395 (2d ed. 1960). The statute reads in part "the justices there shall assign to
the same poor person or persons, counsel learned, by their discretions, which shall give
their counsels, nothing taking for the same." Id.; see also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 741.
27. Christiansen, supra note 21, at 1.
28. Luban, A Workable Plan for Mandatory Pro Bono, 5 U. MD. REP. FROM CENTER FOR
PHIL. AND PUB. POL'Y 10, 12 (Winter 1985); see also Maher, No Bono: The Efforts of the
Supreme Court of Florida to Promote the Full Availability of Legal Services, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV.
973, 989 (1987).
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tributions lawyers have made on a voluntary basis. While this ra-
tionale first surfaced in 1981,29 it is noteworthy that it is once again
a critically important motivation for mandatory pro bono in 1990
despite nine years of growth in voluntary pro bono programs.3 0
Each of the justifications advanced for mandatory pro bono is
compelling and valid. The degree to which those with critical legal
needs are denied assistance, simply because they cannot afford such
assistance, is intolerably high in a society which claims its basis in
law, justice, and equality. Concerns about the decline in profession-
alism among attorneys also are well-grounded. Finally, supporters
of public service should be concerned greatly about the present sta-
tus of voluntary pro bono. The promise of organized volunteerism
has not been met. Nevertheless, despite the validity of the well-
springs of mandatory pro bono, it is not clear that mandatory pro
bono is the only-or even the most effective-solution to these con-
cerns. To ascertain whether mandatory pro bono programs are re-
sponsive to these three issues, it is essential to assess the growth of
voluntary pro bono programs in the 1970s and 1980s and to analyze
the outcome of mandatory pro bono proposals during that same
period.
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF VOLUNTARY PRO BONO
Organized volunteerism among lawyers has existed in this na-
tion since the beginning of the twentieth century.3 ' Voluntary pro
bono efforts waned," however, with the advent of the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation 3 and increased federal funding for legal services
for the poor in civil matters,3 4 as well as with the expansion of the
constitutional right to appointed counsel for criminal defendants.3 5
29. See Christiansen, supra note 21, at 12-14.
30. See ABA CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, THE 1989 DIRECTORY
OF PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT PROGRAMS 181 (1989) [hereinafter PBI DIRECTORY] (de-
tailing the establishment of pro bono programs by year since 1980).
31. See generally E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 25-40 (1951 & Supp.
196 1) (discussing changes in legal aid coverage from 1917 to 1947); R. SMITH, JUSTICE
AND THE POOR 133-49 (3d ed. 1924) (tracing the history of legal aid organizations in the
United States to 1916).
32. See J. HANDLER, E. HOLLINGSWORTH & H. ERLANGER, LAWYERS AND THE PURSUIT
OF LEGAL RIGHTS 123 (1978) (attempting to verify the perception that pro bono work by
large law firms had declined since the 1960s).
33. SeeJ. DOOLEY & A. HOUSEMAN, LEGAL SERVICES HISTORY 1-16 (2d draft 1985).
34. See id. at 16-27.
35. See Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional
Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 630 (1986);
Strazella, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims: New Uses, New Problems, 19 ARIZ. L. REV.
443, 443-45 (1977).
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By the late 1970s, many bar associations, which had sponsored at
least rudimentary volunteer pro bono programs in the past, had lit-
tle or no involvement in pro bono activities. 6 Despite some impor-
tant pockets of activity and innovation, the latter half of the 1970s
was a quiet time for voluntary pro bono efforts on the whole.
A series of unforeseen events, however, revitalized voluntary
pro bono programs. In 1981, the Reagan administration sought to
eliminate the Legal Services Corporation completely, then funded at
$321 million dollars.37 This threat mobilized the support of Con-
gress and of the organized bar. Federal funding was retained, but at
a drastically reduced level.3 8 As a result of its role in ensuring the
survival of legal services for the poor, the organized bar at the na-
tional, state, and local levels, became acutely aware of the unmet
need for legal services and of the diminishing resources available to
address that need. This consciousness manifested itself in unremit-
ting support for increased funding for legal services on the part of
lawyers and the organized bar.39 Within the ABA and in many com-
munities, it also led to the adoption of expanded voluntary pro bono
services as one of the bar's major priorities.4 °
The outcome of these events represents one of the most dra-
matic developments in the history of legal services for the poor. In
1981 there were approximately fifty voluntary pro bono programs,
many of them quite limited in scope.4 1 Currently there are almost
600 voluntary programs. 42 The decision in 1981 by the Board of
Directors of the Legal Services Corporation to require that its bene-
ficiaries use a portion of their federal funds to encourage pro bono
36. E. Lardent, Pro Bono in the 1990's: The Uncertain Future of Attorney Volunta-
rism (May 1989) (to be published by the American Bar Association) (report prepared for
the ABA Consortium on Legal Services and the Public's Conference on Access to Justice
in the 1990s).
37. See M. KESSLER, LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR 8-9 (1987).
38. See Id. at 9. The 1984 budget for the Legal Services Corporation was $241
million.
39. See Harrell, The Continuing Need for Private Bar Involvement in the Delivery of Legal
Services to the Poor, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 227, 227 (1983) (in 1981 "more than 400
state and local bars joined with the ABA and other groups to express support for the
Legal Services Corporation . . .").
40. Id. at 227-28; see also McCoy, Pro Bono Publico: Federal Legal-Aid Cuts Spur the Bar to
Increase Free Work for the Poor, Wall St. J., Mar. 30, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
41. Miskiewicz, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
42. See PBI DIRECTORY, supra note 30, at 179-83; E. Lardent, supra note 36, at 2; see
also 1 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMIT-rEE TO RE-
VIEW THE PROPOSAL PLAN FOR MANDATORY PRO BONO SERVICE 10-11 (Oct. 16, 1989)
[hereinafter NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION] (describing the scope of various New
York pro bono programs).
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and reduced fee efforts provided the resources to support a more
professional and organized voluntary pro bono effort.
As a result of the prominence given pro bono by the bar and
the increased funding available, organized pro bono programs with
professional staff administrators are now in place in virtually every
area of the nation.4" Despite greatly intensified and highly creative
recruitment efforts, the participation figures reported by pro bono
programs show that, on the average, only 16.9% of the nation's law-
yers are involved in organized pro bono programs for the poor.44
In the 1980s, voluntary pro bono programs enjoyed an unparal-
leled level of support, funding, and growth. 45 Despite the strengths
of these programs, as well as the presence of many innovative and
effective programs, two factors appear to presage a trend toward
stagnancy among voluntary pro bono efforts.
The first is the dramatic change experienced by private practi-
tioners, particularly those in large law firms, with respect to the eco-
nomics of law practice.46 There is no question that law firms have
become more business-like in recent years, with a greater emphasis
on administration and on the bottom line. Commentators cite a va-
riety of reasons for this trend. Some identify the staggering infla-
tion in starting associate salaries as the culprit.47 Others cite the
increased legitimacy of competition and marketing among larger
firms and the increase in advertising by smaller firms and sole prac-
titioners.4s The emphasis on billable hours, per-partner draws,
profitability, and the expanded importance of rainmakers also has
43. Miskiewicz, supra note 3, at 1, col. 1.
44. PBI DIRECTORY, supra note 30, at 182-83. These self-reported figures may be
inflated. The author has visited numerous pro bono programs to provide technical
assistance or to evaluate the programs' effectiveness. Typically, program volunteer par-
ticipation lists may include attorneys whose preferred areas of volunteer service rarely
are needed, attorneys who provide brief service once a year, and volunteer mentors and
trainers who rarely participate.
45. See E. Lardent, supra note 36, at 2; see also 1 NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE PROPOSAL PLAN FOR MANDATORY PRO
BoNo SERVICE 10-11 (Oct. 16, 1989) [hereinafter NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION]
(describing the scope of various New York pro bono programs).
46. See B. HILDEBRANDT &J. KAUFMAN, THE SUCCESSFUL LAW FIRM: NEW APPROACHES
TO STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT 4-5 (2d ed. 1988); R. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER:
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 7-12 (1988) (discussing reasons
for changes in the structure and organization of large firms).
47. See B. HILDEBRANDT &J. KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 11; The NLJ 250, Nat'l L.J.
Special Career Issue, Oct. 1989, at 19, col. 1 (listing starting salaries for associates at the
250 largest law firms in the nation).
48. See B. HILDEBRANDT &J. KAUFMAN, supra note 46, at 9-10; M. STEVENS, POWER OF
ATTORNEY: THE RISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMS 37 (1987).
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been blamed.49 The changes in the legal profession which have de-
stabilized firms by making lateral transfers, mergers, and law firm
dissolutions commonplace have so eroded loyalty to the individual
firm that compensation has become a determinative factor in career
decisions. 5° Finally, some lawyers assign the blame to legal newspa-
pers, whose surveys now highlight and broadly disseminate financial
information previously not widely known even within each firm.5'
Commentators disagree on the causal significance of these develop-
ments, but the result has been a growing emphasis on financial con-
cerns within the legal profession. Regardless of cause or effect, it is
unfortunate that the dramatic acceleration of bottom line decision-
making has made it more difficult to encourage enhanced voluntary
efforts, particularly from large law firms.
The second factor that has inhibited the effectiveness of volun-
tary pro bono efforts is the culture which has arisen among the vol-
untary programs of the 1980s.52 Developed at a time when legal
services programs were concerned with survival and faced deep
funding cuts, these programs were not always created with a careful
attention to purpose, structure, and function. Surprisingly, despite
nine years of growth, there has been no substantial effort to define
the role of voluntary pro bono in addressing unmet legal needs. In
addition, there has been no comprehensive effort to establish pro-
gram norms and standards. In the absence of a clear mission and of
formal assessment criteria, an informal but very powerful measure-
ment system has arisen. This system relies upon quantitative, exter-
nal criteria. Program success typically is measured by the number or
percentage of attorney volunteers, the number of cases handled (an
often dubious measure because of the lack of uniformity in the defi-
nition of a case), and the success and scope of the program's public
relations efforts.5" While quantifiable information and program
reputation certainly are important aspects of program effectiveness,
there is too little emphasis on key qualitative aspects of program
operations. Programs are not judged by their impact on the most
critical legal needs of low-income persons or by the quality of the
legal assistance provided by volunteers. In many instances, these
49. See Young, Carlton, Mayden & Molod, Greed is Good?, 15 BARRISTER 13 (Winter
1988) (excerpting a dlebate on the causes of the decline in young lawyers' commitment
to pro bono).
50. See E. Lardent, supra note 36, at 8-9.
51. See, e.g., The NLJ 250, supra note 47, at 19, col. 1 (listing starting salaries for
associates at the 250 largest law firms in the nation).
52. E. Lardent, supra note 36, at 3.
53. Id. at 4.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
programs are understaffed or staffed by administrators who do not
have substantive legal expertise. 54 Many volunteer programs do not
have effective systems for oversight of cases, training, support, and
other essential elements of program administration. Typically,
these programs focus only on relatively simple matters and on cases
which do not involve mainstream poverty law issues.55
A number of voluntary pro bono programs have increased par-
ticipation levels substantially, enhanced program quality, and devel-
oped innovative approaches to address emerging legal needs.56
These programs, however, are the exceptions. Many voluntary pro
bono programs are moving toward stagnancy and irrelevancy. As a
result, the strongest proponents of pro bono service are frustrated
by the apparent inability of voluntary programs to galvanize the sup-
port of the bar and to address the increasing volume of legal needs.
They have become, often reluctantly, the most passionate support-
ers of a mandatory system.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MANDATORY PRO BONO PROGRAMS
In light of the relatively low profile of pro bono service in the
1970s, it is somewhat surprising that the first wave of mandatory pro
bono proposals began in 1977.57 The apparent impetus for many of
these proposals was the ABA's pro bono resolution, adopted in
1975.58 Although this resolution-known as the "Montreal resolu-
tion"-did not address the mandatory pro bono issue, it did define
for the first time "pro bono practice," and it significantly heightened
the visibility of pro bono among state and local bar associations. 59
In 1977, the ABA's Special Committee on Public Interest Practice,
the sponsor of the Montreal resolution, prepared and disseminated
a report6" calling upon state and local bars to take an active role in
supporting pro bono and introduced the notion of a quantifiable,
54. Id. at 4-5.
55. Id.
56. See NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 42, at 9-11; see also J. TYRRELL,
THE LAW FIRM PRO BONO MANUAL 19-22 (discussing special pro bono projects for law
firms); id. at 31-34 (listing pro bono opportunities at one particular large firm); Hill &
Calvocoressi, The Corporate Counsel and Pro Bono Service, 42 Bus. LAW. 675, 684-90 (1987)
(discussing pro bono work of in-house counsel at several large corporations).
57. See Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 255, 261 (1981) (noting the simultaneous mandatory pro bono proposals
set forth by the ABA and the New York City Bar Association).
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though still voluntary, contribution of pro bono service.6
An officer of the State Bar of California and a Special Commit-
tee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York responded
to the ABA's initiative by advocating a mandatory pro bono pro-
gram. The president of the California bar proposed a forty hour per
year requirement for each practicing attorney. The proposal was
extremely controversial and was defeated by the bar.62 In New
York, a special committee created in 1978 undertook a thoughtful
analysis of the pro bono issue and also recommended a mandatory
pro bono requirement. The report of the Bar's Special Committee
on the Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligations63 recommended a 'minimum
initial standard of thirty to fifty hours of service per year, with a
gradual increase of fifty to seventy hours annually.' In terms of the
definitional issues surrounding mandatory pro bono outlined above,
the New York proposal took a moderate approach. Its definition of
public service was relatively broad, going beyond direct representa-
tion to include activities related to the improvement of the adminis-
tration ofjustice, but excluding nonlegal "good citizen" and general
bar association activities. 65. The committee considered and op-
posed, by a divided vote, a buy out provision as well as a collective
law firm approach to the obligation.66 Finally, and most notably, the
committee largely sidestepped the question of enforcement, adopt-
ing a self-reporting requirement which envisioned enforcement only
in the most egregious of circumstances.67 Despite the fact that the
proposal adopted a moderate position on the most controversial
aspects of mandatory pro bono, the Committee's report, like the
California proposal, created a firestorm of protest and was not
adopted.68
The intensity of many lawyers' opposition to even the most
modest quasi-mandatory pro bono proposal became evident in
1980, with the preliminary report of the Kutak Commission in its
61. Id. at 3-5 (resolving that "public interest legal service is legal service provided
without fee or at a substantially reduced fee," which falls into the categories of poverty
law, civil rights law, charitable organization representation, or administration ofjustice).
62. See Bitowt, The Pro Bono Debate, 9 STUDENT LAW. 36, 37 (Dec. 1980).
63. AssocIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A MANDATORY
CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER (1980).
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 12-16.
66. Id. at 18-20.
67. Id. at 24-25.
68. For a more extensive discussion of the New York report, see Rosenfeld, supra
note 57; Torres & Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service Obligation, 29 EMORY
L.J. 997 (1980).
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revision of the Code of Professional Responsibility.6 9 The Commis-
sion's draft contained language in the proposed model rules which
would make pro bono service mandatory. 70 In many respects, how-
ever, the Commission's proposal fell far short of a mandatory pro
bono obligation as defined in this article. 71 For example, the propo-
sal did not include a specific hourly requirement, 72 provided no en-
forcement mechanism, and included only a general reporting
requirement which was later dropped because of intense opposi-
tion.7 ' This proposal, which could not become the basis for any
meaningful or enforceable pro bono obligation, nevertheless
proved as controversial as the California and New York proposals. 74
The ABA, which five years before had affirmed its commitment to
pro bono service, compromised with salutary, nonmandatory lan-
guage, no reporting requirement, a broad-or at least highly ambig-
uous-definition of pro bono, and no quantifiable standard
whatsoever.75 By 1980, based on the experiences of these national,
69. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (First Discussion Draft, Jan. 30, 1980)
[hereinafter DRAFT MODEL RULES]; see also Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-
Its Time Has Come, 35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 727 (1981) (discussing the manner in which the
provisions of the Kutak Commission's pro bono proposal gradually were weakened).
70. Rule 8.1 (subsequently renumbered Rule 6.1), as originally proposed, read as
follows:
A lawyer shall render unpaid public interest legal service. A lawyer may dis-
charge this responsibility by service in activities for improving the law, the legal
system, or the legal profession, or by providing professional services to persons
of limited means or to public service groups or organizations. A lawyer shall
make an annual report concerning such service to appropriate regulatory
authority.
DRAFT MODEL RULES, supra note 69, at 118 (emphasis added).
71. See supra p. 81.
72. See Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J. 47, 49
(1980) ("Our Commission deemed that standard [of requiring a fixed number of hours
each year] inappropriate for a number of reasons.").
73. See Commission Votes Down Pro Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A. J. 951 (1980).
74. Id. ("Kuak ... reported that the mandatory pro bono rule had drawn more fire
than other controversial proposals .... ); see also Kutak Panel Report: No Mandatory Pro
Bono, 67 A.B.A. J. 33, 33 (1981) (the Kutak Commission dropped its recommendation
that lawyers be required to provide pro bono legal services, conceding that "the time for
mandatory pro bono hasn't come").
75. The rule concerning pro bono service ultimately became Rule 6.1 which pro-
vides as follows:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge this
responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee to
persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or organiza-
tions, or by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the
legal profession.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (Final Draft 1983) (emphasis added).
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state, and local bar associations, each with a strong commitment to
pro bono, it appeared that mandatory pro bono was a dead issue.
Most communities responded to the funding cutbacks for legal
services in the early 1980s by developing voluntary pro bono pro-
grams. A very few, despairing of the likelihood that voluntary pro
bono would succeed in their areas, elected to try the mandatory pro
bono route. In Florida, where the Furman case 76 resulted in some of
the earliest legal needs studies and, accordingly, a heightened sense
of urgency about unmet legal needs, several mandatory pro bono
proposals surfaced. 77 Despite the fact that the sponsors and sup-
porters of these proposals included some of the most prominent
lawyers in the state, including past presidents of the Florida Bar, the
Bar itself consistently opposed proposals for mandatory pro bono.
Petitions to establish a mandatory program did not prevail in the
Florida Supreme Court.78
The most successful mandatory programs of the early 1980s
were two court-ordered programs in El Paso, Texas and Westches-
ter County, New York. In El Paso, at the urging of the local legal
services program, the local bar association approved a mandatory
pro bono plan. 79 An order implementing the plan was then entered
76. Florida Bar v. Furman, 376 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 1979). The referee in the case sug-
gested that the court require the Bar to conduct a study to determine the most effective
means of providing legal services to the poor. In response, the court stated "[w]ithout
question, it is our responsibility to promote the full availability of legal services. By
[addressing this issue in a separate proceeding] under our supervisory power, we insure
a thorough consideration of the overall problem without delaying the present adjudica-
tion." Id. at 382.
77. See THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR OF FLORIDA, supra note 17; THE FLORIDA BAR,
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ACCESS TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM (June 1985).
78. See In re Emergency Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor, 432 So. 2d 39 (Fla.
1983).
We believe that a person's voluntary service to others has to come from within
the soul of that person. Our canons in this area are designed to be directory, to
enlighten one's conscience, to focus attention on what is right for lawyers to do,
but, historically, have not been meant to force an involuntary act.
Id. at 41 (footnote omitted). In the footnote accompanying the text the court stated:
"Furthermore, the assurance that effective legal services are available to all is not the
sole responsibility of lawyers but is one to be shared by the government and society."
Id. at 41 n.l; see supra text accompanying note 28; see also Maher, supra note 28, at 980
n.38.
79. The El Paso program came about as a result of bar leaders' discouragement over
the low number of legal services provided by volunteers. "[B]ar leaders .. .lined up the
support of ... district judges and ... persuaded bar members to approve the mandatory
pro-bono scheme. Within two weeks, a state-court order requiring participation was in
place." McCoy, supra note 40, at 16, col. 2; see also Miskiewicz, supra note 3, at 8, col. 2
(the El Paso program "drew national attention in 1982, when a county district court
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
by ten district courtjudges.8 1 Since there has never been a compre-
hensive, objective evaluation of the El Paso program, it is difficult to
determine whether that program is in fact mandatory in nature and
how effectively it operates as a mandatory program. There is no
current information about the number of attorneys who simply re-
fuse to comply with the court's orders, but it does not appear that
any sanction process is in place. As of October 1986, however, ap-
proximately 150 members of the bar had been granted informal ex-
emptions.8 A number of firms have contracted with other
attorneys, for a fee, to meet their obligations under the program.
Although the number of participating attorneys undoubtedly is
higher than it would be in the average voluntary program, it is not
clear that the aggregate services provided are greater. A report of
the program's activities indicates that the average attorney accepted
1.5 cases annually, expending an average of 10 hours per case, for
an annual commitment of 15 hours, significantly below the average
commitment identified in mandatory and voluntary programs.8 2 In
addition, the variety of cases accepted in El Paso is extremely lim-
ited. 3 Without additional information and evaluation, it is difficult
to assess the impact of the El Paso program. Despite a flurry of
controversy and opposition when the program was initiated, it ap-
pears to be relatively noncontroversial today. However, it certainly
is possible that the lack of opposition reflects the nonenforcement
of the lawyer's obligation and the very modest amount of service
required rather than any real acceptance of the mandatory concept.
In Westchester, as in El Paso, it appeared to the legal services
program that efforts to establish a voluntary program would be fu-
tile. Indeed, a solicitation letter sent to three thousand members of
the bar yielded only two volunteers.8 4 In 1981, the Westchester
County Supreme Court agreed to appoint attorneys as uncompen-
sated counsel in individual divorce cases.8 5 As with the El Paso pro-
granted an El Paso bar motion requiring that every lawyer in the county accept up to two
cases per year").
80. McCoy, supra note 40, at 16, col. 2.
81. Interview with Gracie Torres, Program Paralegal for the El Paso Legal Assistance
Society (Oct. 1986) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review); see letter from Cathy M.
Barnes, Executive Director of the El Paso Legal Assistance Society, to Jane Vosbisch,
Program Consultant of the ABA Private Bar Involvement Project (Jan. 24, 1986) (stating
valid reasons to claim exemptions) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
82. REPORT ON THE EL PASO PRO BONO PROJECT 7 (prepared by Prof. W. Frank
Newton, Baylor University School of Law) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
83. McCoy, supra note 40, at 16, col. 2.
84. Dean, Pro Bono Digest, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 21, 1987, at 2, col. 1.
85. Id. Because of severe staff reductions, Westchester County Legal Services was
[VOL. 49:78
1990] MANDATORY PRO BoNo IN CIVIL CASES: AGAINST 97
gram, no objective evaluation of the Westchester program has been
undertaken. In many respects, however, it appears that the experi-
ence and actual implementation of the two programs has been quite
similar. s6 After some initial opposition, lawyers apparently have ac-
cepted the program. As with the El Paso program, however, there is
a real question about the impact of the Westchester program on
critical legal needs and the true acceptance of the program among
the bar. Once again, the level of participation is limited; only family
law attorneys are included in the mandatory pool. s 7 A bar with
more than three thousand members handled only seven hundred
cases in a five-year period. This reflects a participation level lower
than many voluntary pro bono programs.88 Again, the emphasis is
on a narrow type of case rather than the broad range of legal
problems. As with El Paso, there is little indication that sanctions
are imposed upon those who refuse to meet their obligation, making
these programs only quasi-mandatory in nature. More limited ver-
sions of the Westchester program are now being implemented in
other areas of New York. 9 It is encouraging that opposition to
these court-ordered plans appears minimal. Nevertheless, the pau-
city of information about the actual impact of these programs-as
well as their limited scope-makes it very difficult to generalize
about the impact or feasibility of mandatory pro bono on the basis
of these experiences.
The mandatory pro bono initiatives of the early 1980s were few
in number and modest in scope. The past two years, however, have
seen a revival of interest in mandatory pro bono and an unprece-
dented level of activity in devising proposals for mandatory pro-
grams. Mandatory pro bono proposals have surfaced in recent years
in states as varied as Florida,9 ° which currently has a new mandatory
forced to stop accepting divorce cases. In response to the great unmet need for legal
services by indigents in this area, an administrative judge decided to appoint "matrimo-
nial attorneys on a mandatory basis to represent poor persons seeking divorces." Id.
86. Compare Dean, supra note 84 and Norlander, Court Appointed Divorce Counsel For Poor
Persons, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 32 (Apr. 1984) and Fink, Why We Don't Have Waiting List for
Divorces, PRIVATE BAR ACTIVITIES REPORT, Dec. 1986, at 2 (bi-monthly publication of the
Committee on Legal Aid of the New York State Bar Association) with REPORT ON THE EL
PASO PRO BONO PROJECT, supra note 82 and letter from Cathy M. Barnes, supra note 81
(all sources discussing the respective problems and successes of implementing the West-
chester and El Paso programs).
87. Norlander, supra note 86, at 33.
88. Fink, supra note 86. But see Dean, supra note 84, at 2, col. 1 (indicating that 683
participating attorneys were assigned 895 cases during the same 5-year period).
89. See, e.g., Dean, supra note 84.
90. See In re Petition for Provision of Legal Aid to the Poor, No. 89-74,538 (Fla. filed
Aug. 8, 1989); see also Graham, supra note 6, at 62.
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pro bono proposal couched in terms of the power of the courts to
appoint counsel, Maryland, 9 New York,92 North Dakota,93 and
Washington.94 These proposals have been driven, as their prede-
cessors were, by a number of factors including legal needs studies
which dramatically demonstrated the extent of unmet legal
problems,9 5 growing concerns about the lack of professionalism
among the bar as a whole,9 6 and a sense of despair about the lack of
growth in voluntary programs.97 While action on a number of these
proposals is still pending, the pattern with respect to mandatory pro
bono proposals is strikingly similar to the mandatory efforts of the
late 1970s. In almost every instance, a committee of the bar domi-
nated by those deeply concerned about the lack of access to legal
services adopts a plan of action to expand legal services, with
mandatory pro bono as one element of that plan. The response to
the committee's proposal is, typically, a watering-down of the
91. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 17, at 32 (recommending that the Maryland Court of
Appeals adopt a rule requiring all private attorneys to accept at least one pro bono case
a year on behalf of an indigent person).
92. See PRELIMINARY REPORT OF NEW YORK, supra note 17; see also Dean, supra note
84.
93. See Graham, supra note 6, at 62 ("A special Civil Legal Services Committee in
North Dakota will submit a mandatory plan to the state bar association's board of
governors").
94. See LEGAL AID COMMITrEE OF THE WASHINGTON STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, A RE-
PORT ON THE NEED FOR CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES FOR PERSONS IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
(Nov. 1988); see also Graham, supra note 6, at 62. In Washington State, legislative hear-
ings were held on mandatory pro bono and the view was that the legislature might "re-
visit" the issue if the private bar failed to increase voluntary pro bono activities. Id.
95. See supra note 17. "A draft report by North Dakota's Civil Legal Services Com-
mittee suggests that 97 percent of the civil legal needs of the state's poor and 'near poor'
are not being met." See Graham, supra note 6, at 62.
Maryland's experience with a mandatory pro bono proposal is very much in line
with the history of mandatory service in other jurisdictions. See ACTION PLAN, supra note
17, at 28-29. In light of the direct experience that other contributors to this debate have
had with the Maryland efforts, the author will not undertake a detailed analysis here.
96. See, e.g., Eveleth, Our Public Image: A Matter of Perception?, 22 MD. B.J. 4
(Sept./Oct. 1989).
"The public view is that the profession is losing its professionalism .... [Olne
of the most prevalent and damaging perceptions the legal profession must fight
is that lawyers service themselves rather than the public. The general impres-
sion seems to be that, at one time, lawyers as a profession traditionally contrib-
uted much to pro bono causes, charitable endeavors and society as a whole.
Today, however, it is felt they give very little.
Id. at 6-7.
97. See Graham, supra note 6, at 62 (quoting former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance,
now a partner with a New York law firm: "For years I have hoped that we lawyers would
be able to meet our obligations by voluntary actions .... As the years have passed,
however, I am forced to conclude that this is unlikely. Therefore, I believe that ... pro
bono service for all lawyers should be mandated.").
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mandatory aspect, rendering the plan toothless, and finally an aban-
donment of any mandatory pro bono plan.
V. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING
MANDATORY PRO BONO
In addition to the often insurmountable political difficulties en-
countered in seeking support for a mandatory pro bono plan, the
implementation of mandatory programs presents a host of practical
problems which have not been addressed in most states.9 8
Existing pro bono programs often find their resources
stretched to the limit as they coordinate the pro bono efforts of the
approximately seventeen percent of the bar currently participating
in organized pro bono programs. 99 Many programs find that they
do not have the staff or resources to train volunteers effectively,
monitor cases, or even maintain accurate and up-to-date referral
records. Although mandatory pro bono ideally would free up the
considerable program resources expended on recruitment efforts,
some type of recruitment likely would still be necessary to prompt
reluctant participants to serve.
Mandatory pro bono would not only increase the number of
attorneys that programs would be required to manage; it also would
increase dramatically the administrative complexity of each step in
the process of referring a pro bono case. Materials on the adminis-
tration of voluntary pro bono programs cite essential program ele-
ments and operations which ensure successful programs. 0 0 In a
mandatory system, these essential elements, often undeveloped or
completely absent in many voluntary programs, would become criti-
cal. For example, recordkeeping must be accurate when there is a
threat of sanctions. In the likely event that the obligation is defined
broadly, including some kind of partial or total financial buy out, the
recordkeeping requirements would become unmanageable for most
programs. The likelihood of carryover provisions, in which excess
hours or cases in one year would be counted toward the next, would
98. See, e.g., Advisory Council of the Maryland Legal Services Corporation, First
Hearing on the Draft Report of the Advisory Council of the Maryland Legal Services
Corporation, Summary of Testimony Presented (Oct. 19, 1987) (the testimony of John
Michener, Director of the Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Services, does not recognize the
devastating impact that a mandatory program will have on existing organized pro bono
programs) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
99. See PBI DIRECTORY, supra note 30, at 182-83.
100. See, e.g., E. Lardent, supra note 36, at 4-6. See generally ABA SPECIAL COMMIrEE
ON LAWYERS' PUBLIC SERVICE RESPONSIBLITY, THE RESOURCE: A PRO BONO MANUAL (E.
Lardent ed. 1983).
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further complicate record-keeping systems, because the body
charged with enforcement of the obligation surely will look to the
pro bono programs for timely and accurate records on the annual
level of participation of each attorney. Training, support, and case
monitoring, always critical to the success of a pro bono program,
become even more essential when there are reluctant participants.
Some substantial funding would have to be provided for litigation
related costs, malpractice insurance, and other expenses in an invol-
untary program. Additional resources would have to be provided to
review reports, enforce the obligation, hear appeals, process re-
quests for exemption, and determine whether a particular effort
meets the definition for purposes of reporting.
Proponents of mandatory pro bon0 must ask themselves
whether it is economically feasible or efficient to increase current
funding for pro bono five-fold to accommodate the increased
caseload and administrative burdens; whether they are prepared to
divert substantial funds from client services to the process of investi-
gating and disciplining nonparticipatory attorneys; and whether
most existing programs have the structural framework and exper-
tise, even with additional resources, to accommodate a tidal wave of
new cases and new volunteers.
VI. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF MANDATORY PRO BONO
The administrative difficulties inherent in implementing a
mandatory pro bono system, while daunting, are not insurmounta-
ble. It is essential, however, to determine whether, after the dust
has settled on the mandatory debate, the resulting program is worth
both the battle and the administrative expense.
Unfortunately, the end product of a successful campaign for a
mandatory pro bono program probably will fail to meet the original
goals of the program's proponents. Experience demonstrates that
the political compromises involved in securing approval of such a
program will result in a definition of pro bono service so broad that
it encompasses activities already undertaken by virtually all law-
yers.'' All lawyers will be in compliance, yet no additional services
to address unmet legal needs will be provided.
Nor will the adoption of a mandatory program effect a change
in the bar's diminishing sense of professionalism or in the public's
perception of the bar. The unseemly wrangling which inevitably ac-
companies debates over mandatory pro bono only serves to rein-
101. See, e.g., supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
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force the public's perception of lawyers as self-interested and to
make lawyers despair about their colleagues. The argument that
lawyers, once forced to provide services, inevitably will embrace the
cause of public service is not borne out by experience. Have lawyers
grown to love the study of law for its own sake because of
mandatory continuing legal education?
In most instances, of course, mandatory pro bono will not be
adopted. But the same damage will be done. Definitions of pro
bono work, even on a voluntary basis, will be expanded so as to
institutionalize the status quo. The level of discourse during the in-
evitable hearings and debates will lower lawyers' self-esteem and the
public's perception of the profession. There may be a backlash
against voluntary programs, whose effectiveness will be put in ques-
tion by the mandatory debate. In some instances, of course, the de-
bate around mandatory pro bono may serve to focus and heighten
the awareness of the bar and the public regarding the deficiencies of
our justice system. 10 2 The debate over mandatory pro bono, how-
ever, will so dominate the attention of the public and the profession
that the really important story-the crisis in access to civil legal serv-
ices-is lost. 103
CONCLUSION
Mandatory pro bono will not increase services, enhance profes-
sionalism, or improve the performance of existing pro bono pro-
grams. The emphasis on mandatory pro bono blurs the critical
issue-the provision of legal assistance to low income persons and
others currently unable to find assistance. It constitutes a troubling
retreat from the central proposition that addressing that issue is pri-
marily a matter of public, not professional obligation in the highly
regulated and litigious American legal system. Proponents of
mandatory pro bono would better serve the goals they seek by chan-
neling their energies to ensure that this public obligation is met,
whether through a "civil Gideon"l°4 case which establishes the right
to counsel in civil matters or through legislative initiatives which en-
102. The Maryland experience, which has resulted in a broadbased, effective cam-
paign to increase both public and private resources for the provision of legal services is a
laudable model. See ACTION PLAN, supra note 17.
103. In New York State, for example, the results of the State's recently completed
legal needs study may be eclipsed by the furor surrounding the debate over mandatory
pro bono.
104. For a discussion of the civil Gideon concept, see Johnson, The Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 341 (1985).
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sure access to justice for all regardless of their resources. Mandatory
pro bono will not enhance the public service activities of the bar, a
laudable and vitally important goal. Instead, there should be a com-
mitment to making voluntary pro bono as effective as possible. This
will involve creating real incentives for pro bono participation, in-
cluding making the commitment to pro bono work a key factor in
decisions regarding partnership and compensation and providing
special benefits to lawyers active in pro bono. Finally, there should
be a commitment to improving the resources and operations of the
current voluntary pro bono infrastructure so that the existing pro-
grams can begin to meet their potential. The current voluntary sys-
tem is underfunded, unfocused, and inadequately structured. We
should strive to make that system function effectively before we con-
sider scrapping it for a mandatory system which offers an illusory
promise of greater good.
